This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other type of compensation. The model explains why good countrywide investor protection breeds good firm governance and predicts a "race to the top" in firm-governance quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, such governance changes may be associated with higher rather than lower CEO pay as CEOs substitute away from private benefits. The model also provides an explanation for the observed correlation of CEO pay and firm governance as driven by CEO power.
Introduction
The scope for CEO power in public corporations is vast. One view is that powerful CEOs influence the board of directors into paying them a high compensation preferably with little or no strings attached (Bebchuk et al. (2002) ). Another view argues that powerful CEOs engage in changing the very governance that monitors and evaluates their actions (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Hellwig (2000) ). Accordingly, the rules of the game by which management is compensated and incentives are granted are not static and are themselves subject to change by management. This paper analyzes how CEO power affects the choice of CEO pay and the design of firm governance. We ask how changes in the external governance environment, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), affect incentives in exercising CEO power and internal governance.
In the wake of SOX, Coca-Cola Co., the Washington Post Co., Bank One, General Electric, General Motors and Procter & Gamble all announced that they would voluntarily start expensing executive stock options, long before in 2004 the Financial Accounting Standards Board presented a draft of its accounting standard on options expensing, SFAS 123(R). 1 Studying the impact of SOX on corporate boards, Linck et al. (2006) document that post-SOX fewer directors are current executives and more directors are lawyers, consultants or financial experts, and that audit committees doubled the number of meetings. This evidence suggests that a "race to the top" was initiated at the time of the enactment of SOX.
The pattern of internal governance improvements following SOX is consistent with the recent cross-country empirical finding in Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and Love (2004) that external governance, as measured by indices of anti-director rights or the rule-of-law, is positively associated with internal governance, as measured by various firm-level transparency and accountability variables.
The evidence that good external governance breeds good internal governance is puzzling in light of the implicit view in the literature that external governance acts as a substitute for 1 The statement requires that the compensation fair-value cost relating to share-based payment transactions be recognized in financial statements and was to be implemented by public entities (other than those filing as small business issuers) as of the first interim or annual reporting period that began after June 15, 2005 . But already in April 1, 2004 , Business Week 's article "Expensing Options: An Overblown Storm" reported: "Some 500 publicly traded companies have already started expensing options, or said they will." internal governance. This view is influenced by the observation in La Porta et al. (1998 Porta et al. ( , 2000 of a negative correlation of shareholder ownership and country-wide investor protection, as well as by the theories that argue that external finance and the market for corporate control can act as a disciplining device in the absence of good firm governance (e.g. Jensen (1986) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Hauswald and Marquez (2005) show that improvements in dissemination technology which allow for greater disclosure can generate both improved external governance and less internal board monitoring.
The main result of the model is that good external governance breeds good internal governance. We present a simple contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. In the model, CEO power can be used to extract formal pay and private benefits from the firm. Extraction of private benefits is costly to the CEO for two reasons. First, if the CEO is monitored he has to return the diverted income and pay a deadweight fee. Second, because of this risk, private-benefits extraction increases the volatility of the CEO's total income, which is costly for a CEO with risk aversion. In spite of these costs, positive private benefits occur because they are nonverifiable by the firm's shareholders, if the CEO is not monitored. Moreover, to make it easier to extract private benefits, CEOs can spend effort to change the monitoring intensity of the shareholders, interpreted here as changing governance. In an optimal contract, shareholders may allow the change in governance and increased diversion in exchange for offering a lower wage.
The result that good external governance complements good internal governance is surprising in our model, since we assume that external and internal governance are substitutes in limiting diversion: more of one should then reduce the need for the other. Intuitively, with preferences that exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, high-powered CEOs, which get paid more, become less risk averse and take greater gambles in diverting output. This increases incentives to worsen internal governance and to divert even more output. When external governance improves, the perverse incentive effect of CEO pay is weakened. It is then possible for firms to give more formal pay to a CEO without unduly generating incentives to change governance, resulting in better overall firm-level governance. This mechanism applies when the level of risk aversion is low. With high risk aversion, the amount of diversion per unit of formal pay is lower, and CEO pay generates only a small perverse incentive to worsen gov-ernance. This makes CEOs with high risk aversion unwilling to gamble diverting output. It is the low-powered CEOs that receive too little formal pay that choose to change governance.
While we are unable to derive an analytical result for this case, numerical results suggest that when external governance improves, incentives can be granted more efficiently through formal pay and internal governance also improves.
Better external and internal governance does not imply lower CEO pay. Indeed, the model predicts that CEO pay may increase as a result of SOX if CEO power is unaffected with the governance changes: firms substitute away from costlier private benefits and into formal pay when compensating CEOs. This increase in CEO pay is independent of any pay increase that might be justified by the higher certification costs implied by SOX. 2 The model also predicts a negative relationship between governance and CEO pay for CEOs with low risk aversion. This negative relationship is consistent with the empirical finding in Core et al. (1999) , now widely documented in the CEO compensation literature, that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker governance, controlling for common pay factors. In our paper this association is driven by cross-sectional variation in CEO power. Direct evidence in favor of our mechanism is given in Malmendier and Tate (2005) . They find that CEOs that receive prestigious awards from the business press, which presumably increase their power, are able to extract more compensation while their firms display more earnings management after the award. Their analysis attributes these effects to CEO power unrelated to CEO ability, because they use a control sample of successful CEOs that did not get any press award.
Ours is not the first explanation for the positive association between country-wide and firmlevel governance. La Porta et. al (1998) (LLSV) claim that as a legal matter it may be costly for firms to opt out of existing legal rules, because courts may not be knowledgeable or willing to enforce such contracts. However, as Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) claim, and LLSV admit, often legal rules are not binding and firms do opt out of them in their corporate charters.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence in favor of the opting-out hypothesis in Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) for a cross-section of countries, and Gompers et al.
(2004) across US firms, as these papers show that (i) there is considerable variation in firmgovernance indicators within countries and (ii) firm value is significantly affected by the level 2 For example, "Special Report: CEO pay 'business as usual'," in USA Today, March 2005. of internal governance after controlling for country-wide governance.
Durnev and Kim (2005) predict a negative relationship between external governance and the dollar value of diversion, which they interpret as inducing a positive association between the quality of external and internal governance. However, changing the dollar value of diversion does not necessarily guarantee that internal governance laws would be changed as we demonstrate in the paper. Moreover, the findings in Atanassov and Kim (2006) suggest that in countries with weak governance and strong labor unions, collusion between management and labor might stall any internal reform in the face of external changes (see also Pagano and Volpin (2005) ). In another related paper, Sansing and Stocken (2006) predict that after SOX, firms should choose to have more active boards as these can better reduce the expected costs of noncompliance with Section 404 of the Act. They focus on the role of industry competition, whereas we focus on the role of CEO power and the interaction of governance with CEO pay.
Hermalin and Weisbach (2006) conduct a complementary analysis to ours by focusing on the welfare implications of governance reform. As in our paper, they argue that governance structures arise endogenously in response to the constrained optimization problems faced by the relevant parties. Unlike our paper, they extend Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Hermalin's (2005) adaptation of Holmstrom's (1999) career concern model. There are other papers that, like ours, focus on the ability of CEOs to affect the monitoring mechanism that governs their actions. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) also point out that CEOs use their bargaining power to reduce scrutiny from the board and increase their pay as found in Core et al. (1999) . Almazan and Suarez (2003) develop a model in which shareholders find it sometimes optimal to reduce the monitoring of the CEO in order to economize on CEO compensation. Adams and Ferreira (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2005) examine the dual role of boards, to monitor and to advise management. In order to give advice the board needs the information from the CEO, but can also use this information to increase monitoring. Dow and Raposo (2005) model CEOs who can influence their own pay by changing corporate strategies. Burkart et al. (1997) highlight the fact that too much CEO monitoring can reduce managerial initiative.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present our basic framework. Section 3 presents the solution of the model and Section 4 discusses its properties relating to CEO power, CEO pay and governance. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs to the main results in the text.
The model
We assume in our model that there is no agency conflict between the board of directors and shareholders. We thus refer to them interchangeably. Instead, we focus on the agency conflict between shareholders and the CEO to show that adverse changes in governance can occur, and be optimal from the shareholders' perspective, even when boards act on their fiduciary obligations toward shareholders. We argue that in the presence of imperfect investor protection and nonverifiability of effort to change governance, the CEO has an incentive to spend effort influencing the board toward weaker governance.
Setup
The firm together with the CEO generate a constant output level y. The CEO can divert resources of dy, where the fraction d is chosen by the CEO, resulting in a level of net output equal to y (1 − d).
The monitoring mechanism. As in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), we assume that diversion is observable though non-verifiable unless monitoring takes place. If monitored, the CEO has to return the diverted output dy. We also assume that the CEO faces a punishment for diverting output which constitutes a deadweight loss as it does not accrue to the firm. We model this punishment as a proportion of diverted output ηdy, where η > 0. That is, the more the CEO diverts the more severe is the punishment. We are not aware of any study that tries to quantify the financial value of penalties imposed to CEOs that are caught in fraudulent activities, which would include loss of reputation and opportunity cost of jail time. We also make the assumption of proportional fines without any empirical guidance. However, while in the US jail times are relatively fixed amounts, the income loss due to jail time would presumably yield the desired proportionately.
We let the firm's internal monitoring mechanism be endogenous and subject to change by the CEO albeit with the approval of the board of directors. The change in monitoring promoted by the CEO depends on his effort a ∈ {H, L}, where a = L means that the CEO exerts low effort to change the firm's internal monitoring and the status quo is maintained, and a = H means that the CEO exerts high effort to change monitoring. With low effort, the probability of being monitored is p L . Incurring high effort entails an effort cost of k, but allows the CEO to face a lower probability of being monitored p H < p L . Appointing CEO-friendly boards as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) constitutes one way of reaching p H (see also subsection 2.2). We assume equal monitoring costs paid by the firm for both high and low monitoring intensities.
This assumption gears the results toward fewer firms wanting to pursue weaker governance, because in reality we expect that more monitoring is also costlier. Without loss of generality, we take these costs to be zero.
We assume that CEO effort is nonverifiable. 3 This non-verifiability generates a moral hazard problem between the CEO and the board of directors. We return to the issue of nonverifiability of CEO effort in subsection 2.2 below. Our goal is to study the optimal contract under this moral hazard problem.
Our model setup is related to that in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) . In Shleifer and Wolfenzon, p a is interpreted as a corporate governance mechanism exogenous to the firm and common across all firms. Likewise, the penalty imposed to the CEO η is also exogenous to the firm and common across all firms. Therefore, in their setting governance is dictated by countrywide regulations in the spirit of La Porta et al. (1998) . In our model, the CEO can influence the board of directors to change the firm's charter. We therefore interpret the probability of monitoring p a (a = H, L) as a measure of internal governance and η as a measure of external governance. The latter is determined, for example, by country law and the quality of the judicial system. Under this interpretation, in the model, actions pursued within the country's (exogenous) legal system against the CEO as represented by η are triggered by the internal (endogenous) monitoring of the CEO by the board as represented by p a .
Arguably, η could also be interpreted as internal disciplinary actions taken by the board against the CEO, including dismissal of the CEO, but in our view the likely bigger cost for the CEO comes from stakeholders prosecuting irregularities in a court of law. We do not attach either interpretation to the effort cost k, because the effort cost does not directly impact diversion rates (see below). Instead, a reasonable interpretation of the effort cost is the amount of political capital lost in changing governance which could depend on CEO skill, or lack thereof, in influencing other people. 4 CEO compensation. The board and the CEO agree on an employment contract which specifies a compensation, or wage pair (w,w) to the CEO. The wage w is paid if no monitoring takes place and the wagew is paid if the CEO is monitored. Alternatively, we may interpret the wage w as the fixed wage paid before monitoring takes place and interpret w −w > 0 as a penalty if the CEO is monitored. We look for an optimal contract within a class of contracts where the pair (w,w) satisfiesw = w − d a y. We will discuss the contract form in subsection 2.2 below. Note that the penalty η does not enter here as it is exogenous to the firm and the CEO.
CEO preferences and CEO power. CEOs are risk averse with utility function u (a, c) =
, where γ 6 = 1 is the level of relative risk aversion, c is consumption, and CEO power is given by his reservation utility V : a CEO with power V only accepts a contract if by doing so he attains at least utility V . This assumption is implied also in models with Nash bargaining as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) . Note that with power utility, V < 0 for γ > 1 and V > 0 for γ < 1 since one may assume V = c 1−γ / (1 − γ) for some reservation consumption c > 0. We take CEO power as exogenous while acknowledging that CEO power is likely to depend on various CEO, firm and labor-market characteristics. For example, the ability to change output, the ability to change governance, and CEO risk aversion are all CEO traits that determine CEO power. Similarly, the level of internal governance, p a , and the extent of feasible governance changes, p L − p H , are firm characteristics that help determine CEO power. Endogenizing CEO power is an interesting research avenue that is outside the 4 It is possible that country law also determines a mean levelp of monitoring. Our view is that firms would have some degree of flexibility of opting out or increasing monitoring, therefore leading to their own chosen values of p L or p H (see Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) on this flexibility). 5 We treat the knife-edge, log-case of γ = 1 in the appendix. This case is uninteresting as CEO power does not change incentives to change governance. scope of this paper.
Model timeline. The timeline for the contract is described by the following stages: Stage 1. The board offers contract (w,w).
Stage 2. The CEO accepts or rejects the offer. If he accepts, the CEO extracts at least V from the firm. The next stage starts. Otherwise, the game is over.
Stage 3. The CEO chooses effort a regarding whether or not to change monitoring. Otherwise, he keeps the wage w.
Note that in our model the moral hazard problem arises because the CEO may exert nonverifiable effort to change the monitoring intensity. We do not consider the moral hazard problem in the production stage, which is often studied in the standard textbook moral hazard model. For this reason and because y is constant, w will not depend on y in the optimal contract.
Shareholders' problem. Shareholders, and the board of directors acting on their behalf, are risk neutral and maximize expected profits. Shareholders choose the firm's corporate charter and any governance structure must therefore be optimal from their point of view given the constraints faced, the characteristics of the CEO, and the extant patterns of external and internal governance.
An optimal contract between the CEO and the board maximizes profits subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Formally, we describe the contracting problem in the following program:
subject to: (i) the individual rationality constraint, which requires that the contract compensates the CEO for his power V ,
(ii) the incentive compatibility constraint, which requires that the CEO has no incentive to deviate from the prescribed choice of governance (or effort level), a ∈ arg max e∈{L,H} p e (w − ηd e y)
and (iii) that diversion d a is optimal given the wage w and the action a,
Discussion of assumptions
Nonverifiability of effort. We interpret the monitoring probability or monitoring intensity as the effectiveness of the firm's internal governance. Engaging in effort to change the probability of monitoring is thus equivalent to spending effort to change governance or its effectiveness.
For example, effort could be spent by the CEO in developing creative accounting in an attempt to fool auditors or, as could be inferred from Gillette et al. (2003), in filling the executive suite with inside board members.
Under this interpretation, our assumption on the nonverifiability of effort is an assumption on the nonverifiability of the effectiveness of governance. We argue that this assumption is quite plausible, because in practice many governance rules are not unequivocally bad to shareholders, but CEOs can make them so. Therefore, below we use the terms 'monitoring probability' or 'governance' interchangeably.
To illustrate consider the following examples. Anti-takeover measures such as poison pills can be good to shareholders by blocking unsolicited tender offers. They can also harm shareholders depending on how the CEO and the board respond to a less threatening market for corporate control (see Brickley et al (1994) ). Another example is the willingness of CEOs to sell bonds offering 'change-of-control' clauses to bondholders. While they protect bondholders from leveraged buyouts that decrease the rating of the firm and can be justified to shareholders via a low cost of borrowing, they also entrench management by making takeovers more costly.
Interestingly, poison pills have fallen out of favor due to strong criticism by activist investors, while it has become quite popular to sell bonds with change-of-control covenants. Our assumption of the nonverifiability of the effectiveness of governance is based on the notion that a reasonable case can be made that poison pills and change-of-control covenants are beneficial to shareholders.
There are a variety of other rules, also not unambiguously bad (see Bebchuk et al. (2004) ), whose adoption and impact on governance effectiveness depend on CEO effort: rules allowing special meetings of shareholders to be called only by the board and the chairman, rules eliminating the right of shareholders to act by written consent, rules restricting the removal of directors and filling of vacancies, or the stipulation of supermajority provisions requiring two-thirds or more of shareholder votes to change such rules. While these rules can limit monitoring or its effectiveness by giving CEOs more leeway in the choice of firm policies and a greater opportunity for board capture, they are often justified by CEOs by the need to focus on long term company objectives. Indeed, Burkart et al. (1997) show that they can be optimal for shareholders as they lead to more CEO initiative.
The wage contract. As pointed out earlier, we may interpret the part w in the wage contract (w, e w) as the fixed wage paid before monitoring takes place. We could justify this interpretation by the following reasons: First, most employment contracts have intra-annual installments, though only annual reports are audited by outside firms (when reports are filed to the SEC within one month of the end of the year, all wages, though not bonuses, have already been paid). 6 Second, the recent accounting scandals of WorldCom, Enron, ABB, and others are testimony to the fact that detecting wrongdoing and fraud is often random, relies on 'whistler blowers,' or is triggered by bankruptcy or regulatory probes, and generally occurs with a lag of 1 or more years after which even bonuses have been paid out. Finally, even in the cases where expropriation occurs via misallocation of company funds (e.g., overinvestment, transfer pricing and tunnelling that hurts minority shareholders), CEOs are able to maintain significant pay from their firms when they are fired for bad performance through the use of golden parachutes and stock grants vesting at exit. Obviously, if all compensation is in the form of deferred or restricted pay CEOs get nothing upon being fired with cause, but these cases appear to be rare. CEOs are generally not at will employees and dismissal with cause is "protective of the CEO by sharply circumscribing the conduct for which they can be terminated" (see Schwab and Thomas (2005) , pp. 3-4).
Our other assumption restricting the contracts we consider is that when CEOs are monitored they become liable for returning to shareholders the money diverted, hence w −w = dy. While this offers little controversy, 7 it is strengthened by the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act asks that bonuses and other incentive compensation be forfeited due to earnings re-statements, while
CEOs retain the fixed portion of their compensation (the rule only applies if the re-statement occurs within 12 months of the original financial statement).
Other benefits of good firm governance. Several authors have analyzed the choice of firm-level governance in the context of a firm that needs equity financing to grow (e.g. 
First-best contract
Before we analyze the preceding model, we consider the first best contract. In the first best case, both effort and diversion are observable and verifiable. Thus, the incentive constraints (3) and (4) are absent. We write this problem when effort level a is implemented as follows:
subject to
Simple algebra shows that d F B a = 0, and w F B a = u −1 (V + g (a)) . Thus, in the first best, there is no extraction of private benefits. Moreover, since w F B H > w F B L , implementing low effort is optimal to the shareholders in the first-best contract for any level of risk aversion and managerial power. Powerful CEOs, with high V , extract a high wage payment, but produce no adverse governance changes. In summary:
Lemma 1 For any level of CEO power, the first-best contract supports low effort by the CEO and no diversion.
The intuition for the inefficiency of private benefits is two-fold. First, diversion is inefficient even if the CEO is risk neutral: if the CEO is caught and private benefits are positive he pays deadweight fees of ηd a y. Second, diversion is inefficient even if fees are zero, i.e., η = 0: diversion income adds volatility to the consumption of the risk-averse CEO. If zero private benefits is optimal, then it is also optimal to not spend any effort to change governance.
Model Solution
To solve the optimal contracting problem (1), we first derive the CEO's optimal diversion rate.
We then derive the individually rational and incentive compatible contracts when low effort or high effort are implemented. We finally obtain the optimal contract by choosing the wage rate that implements the level of effort that maximizes expected profits.
Optimal diversion
We start by solving the optimal diversion rate as a solution to problem (4). The first order condition for (4) is
The left hand side is the marginal benefit of diversion and occurs only with probability 1 − p a , if the CEO is not monitored. The right hand side is the marginal cost. When the CEO is monitored, which occurs with probability p a , he receives wagew = w − d a y plus diversion d a y, and pays a fee of ηd a y that increases linearly in d a . Solving out for d a yields the following lemma. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Lemma 2 (Optimal diversion) Suppose y > w and
Then the CEO's optimal diversion rate is given by
Moreover, ∂d a (w) /∂η < 0, ∂d a (w) /∂p a < 0, and ∂d a (w) /∂γ < 0.
Equation (9) reveals that the diversion rate is increasing in wage w, ceteris paribus. This result holds true for general utility functions having the decreasing absolute risk aversion property and is critical in understanding the moral hazard problem studied here. The intuition for this perverse effect of wages is that when the CEO receives higher wages his absolute risk aversion declines making him more willing to take a larger gamble in diverting output (i.e., d a increases). In other words, there is a complementarity between diversion and wages, establishing a positive correlation between the two. 8 Evidence of this complementarity can be found in Johnson et al. (2005) where it is shown that managers at fraud firms earn significantly more total pay than executives at industry-size-matched control firms. 9 Equation (9) also reveals that, holding wages constant, diversion is decreasing in the quality of external governance η as well as in the quality of internal governance p a . Also, the optimal diversion rate is a decreasing function of the size y of the firm. This last result stands in sharp contrast with models that approach governance in a reduced form way and generate constant 8 To see this complementarity explicitly, write expected utility (minus the effort cost) as a function of diversion and wages:
Straightforward differentiation yields (evaluated at the optimum d a ):
which is positive iff diversion is positive. 9 Yermack (2006) finds no significant association between CEO pay and CEOs having perquisites, but he does not attach a dollar value to CEO perks and does not consider other forms of income diversion. In Lemma 2, the term q a is the ratio of diversion income to wage pay. This ratio is linked to the risk-taking propensity of the CEO; it is decreasing in risk aversion as more risk-averse CEOs would rather have a greater portion of their total income come from formal pay as opposed to diversion benefits. This result derives from the fact that diversion generates suboptimal CEO-income volatility and will be helpful later on in understanding the different governance choices of CEOs with respect to different risk aversion.
A sufficient condition for (8) that guarantees an interior solution for diversion (given y > w)
for all a. In fact, the first inequality in (10) is necessary and sufficient to ensure that diversion is positive for all a. The condition states that internal governance is sufficiently poor (i.e., p is low enough) relative to external governance. Our results do not need such strong requirement, but only that optimal diversion is positive in the high-effort scenario a = H, so that it pays to spend effort to change governance. This is the interesting assumption to make, otherwise there is no agency friction to consider. The condition that η > 1 is sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure that the diversion rate is below 1 (given y > w). We assume (10) from now on.
Throughout, we also assume that expected output y is large enough so that profits are always positive.
Given the optimal diversion rate d a , we can derive the CEO's utility
where the term A a is defined as
summarizes the net-benefits of diversion in utility terms. Under the maintained assumption (10) , it is straightforward to show that:
It follows from this lemma and equation (11) that an increase in monitoring intensity p a lowers CEO utility. This is intuitive since a higher probability p a of being caught lowers the net benefits of diversion, ceteris paribus. 10 
Implementing low effort
In this subsection, we solve for the contract when low effort is implemented. By Lemma 2 and (11), we can rewrite the incentive constraint (3) and the individual rationality constraint (2) as
The contract wage w L that implements low effort solves
subject to (13)- (14) . Here d L (w) is given by (9) for a = L.
The following lemma presents the solution. To facilitate the exposition, we define a critical reservation value
This value is such that both the individual rationality constraint (13) and the incentive compatibility constraint (14) are binding.
Lemma 4 (Implementing low effort) Suppose the low effort level is implemented.
(i) Consider γ < 1. Then V ≤ V * 1 is necessary, the wage is
and the profit is
(ii) Consider γ > 1. If V ≥ V * 1 , then the wage and the profit are given by (17) and (18), respectively. If V < V * 1 , then the wage is
The intuition for this lemma is the following. The choice of w trades off incentive provision (through the incentive constraint) and rent extraction (through the individually rationality constraint). By offering a lower wage the board extracts more rents from the CEO, which tightens the individual rationality constraint (13), but in so doing it may destroy the CEO's incentive to behave, violating incentive constraint (14) .
An important result of Lemma 4 is that the wage contract depends critically on CEO risk aversion. To understand this result, re-write the incentive constraint (14) as
To implement low effort, the benefit from changing governance cannot exceed the associated cost. By Lemma 3, this benefit increases with wage when γ < 1 and decreases with wage when γ > 1. Intuitively, when CEO risk aversion is high enough, he has less incentive to change governance since he prefers to enjoy a higher wage rather than to take the risks associated with the extraction of private benefits. The opposite result holds true for a CEO with low risk aversion.
Given the preceding analysis, we can deduce that lowering formal pay to a CEO with γ > 1 tightens both the individual rationality constraint (13) and the incentive constraint (21). If CEO power V exceeds the critical value V * 1 defined in (16), it will be optimal for the board to offer a wage such that it makes the CEO's individual rationality constraint (13) bind without destroying his incentive constraint. If V < V * 1 , it will be optimal for the board to offer a wage such that the incentive constraint constraint (21) binds. At this wage, the individual rationality constraint (13) is satisfied.
By contrast, lowering the wage to a CEO with γ < 1 tightens the individual rationality constraint (13) , but relaxes the incentive constraint (21) . Thus, the optimal wage that implements low effort must make the individual rationality constraint bind. Moreover, CEO power V cannot be too high such that V > V * 1 . Otherwise, CEO pay is so high that he has an incentive to change governance, violating the incentive constraint (21).
Implementing high effort
We now turn to implementing high effort level. As in the previous subsection, we use Lemma 1 and (11) to rewrite the incentive constraint (3) and the individual rationality constraint (2):
The contract wage w H that implements high effort solves
subject to (22)- (23) . Here d H (w) is given by (9) for a = H. The following lemma presents the solution.
Lemma 5 (Implementing high effort) Suppose the high effort level is implemented.
(i) Consider γ < 1. If V ≥ V * 1 , then the wage is given by
and the profit is given by
If V < V * 1 , then the wage is given by
(ii) Consider γ > 1. Then V < V * 1 is necessary, and the wage and the profit are given by (25) - (26), respectively.
We note that V * 1 defined in (16) is such that both the individual rationality constraint (22) and the incentive constraint (23) are binding. In contrast to Lemma 4, when γ < 1, for any level of CEO power, lowering formal pay tightens both the constraints (22) and (23) . To a less powerful CEO (with V < V * 1 ) the board pays a fixed wage that is just incentive compatible and to a more powerful CEO (with V ≥ V * 1 ) the board has to pay a higher wage to meet his individual rationality constraint.
For CEOs with γ > 1, the board can only force the implementation of high effort to those that are less powerful (i.e., V < V * 1 ). Powerful CEOs, with V ≥ V * 1 , demand high wages and reject the income volatility that arises from private benefits. Because a high wage makes the CEO with high risk aversion less willing to change governance, the incentive constraint (23) would be violated.
The optimal contract
To solve for the optimal contract the board compares expected profits under high and low effort. It then chooses the wage rate that implements the effort level consistent with higher profits.
To facilitate exposition, we define the following critical value:
At this value of CEO power the board is indifferent between changing governance and not changing governance for a CEO with high risk aversion (γ > 1). Lemma 6 in the appendix shows that V * 2 < V * 1 . Combining the results from the previous lemmas, we obtain the next proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal contract)
The shape of the contract depends on the CEO's risk aversion parameter as follows:
, then governance is changed, and the optimal wage and profit are given by (25) - (26), respectively. If V < V * 1 , then governance is not changed, and the optimal wage and profit are given by (17)- (18), respectively.
(ii) Consider γ > 1. If V > V * 1 , then governance is not changed, and the optimal wage and profit are given by (17)- (18), respectively. If V * 2 < V < V * 1 , then governance is not changed, and the optimal wage and profit are given by (19) - (20), respectively. If V < V * 2 , then governance is changed, and the optimal wage and profit are given by (25) - (26), respectively. In the region V * 2 < V < V * 1 , implementing low effort is optimal. In addition, since the incentive constraint binds, the optimal wage and shareholder value are flat by Lemma 4. For all other regions, the optimal wage is such that the individual rationality constraint binds. In addition, shareholder value is a locally concave function of V. More formally, powerful CEOs with risk aversion γ > 1 and V > V * 1 choose not to change governance since Lemma 5 shows that high effort to change governance cannot be implemented in the optimal contract. The intuition is that those CEOs avoid monitoring risk associated with diversion and exert their power by choosing high wage rates. They would rather be monitored more often, divert little, and get most of their income as formal pay.
For CEOs with risk aversion γ > 1 and V < V * 1 , both high effort and low effort can be implemented by Lemmas 4-5. In an optimal contract, shareholders will choose one of these effort levels to maximize shareholder value. The tradeoff is the following. Implementing a high effort level to change governance allows CEOs to divert more which lowers shareholder value.
But it may be able to offer the CEOs a lower wage, which raises shareholder value. The net effect depends on the level of CEO power. Formally, there is a critical value V * 2 < V * 1 such that it is optimal for the board to implement high effort to change governance if V < V * 2 , because 11 Figure 1 shows that the Pareto frontier is not globally concave in CEO power V . This implies that randomizations over the contracts listed in Proposition 1 can improve shareholders' value. The details on such randomizations are available from the authors upon request. these CEOs demand very low wages. For CEOs with intermediate power, V * 2 < V < V * 1 , it is optimal for shareholders to implement low effort and governance is not changed.
We now consider CEOs with low risk aversion γ < 1. For powerful CEOs with V > V * 1 , Lemma 4 shows that low effort cannot be implemented. Thus, it is optimal for the shareholders to allow for governance change. This occurs for two reasons: (i) with lower risk aversion the desired share of diversion income to wage pay is higher by Lemma 2; and (ii) a CEO with low risk aversion is also less concerned about income volatility implicit in (w,w) and the monitoring probabilities (p H , 1 − p H ). For less powerful CEOs with V < V * 1 , Lemmas 4-5 show that both high and low effort levels can be implemented. However, to maximize shareholder value, low effort level is optimal and governance is not changed.
CEO power, CEO pay, and governance
In this section, we analyze the implications of the optimal contract derived in Proposition 1.
Good external governance breeds good internal governance
Two recent papers using a new panel dataset from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) on cross-country measurements of firm-level and country-wide governance show that good countrywide governance breeds good firm-level governance (Durnev and Kim (2005) In our model we find that:
Proposition 2 If γ < 1, good external legal governance breeds good internal governance in the sense that V * 1 increases with η.
This result is surprising in our model, since we assume that external and internal governance are substitutes in limiting diversion. More of one should then reduce the need for the other.
The intuition for the result is that in the model better country-wide governance η discourages diversion and makes it easier to incentivize the CEO by Lemma 2. That is, when γ < 1 the firm can pay a higher wage to the CEO without unduly giving his incentives to take risks associated with weakening governance. The agency problem is alleviated and more CEOs choose not to spend effort trying to influence the board. Formally, the result obtains because the critical value V * 1 increases with η and governance is not changed for CEOs with low power V < V * 1 by Proposition 1. When γ > 1 whether a positive relationship arises between external and internal governance is determined by the sign of dV * 2 /dη. When this derivative is negative, firms will less often accept internal governance changes if external governance improves, since Proposition 1 shows that only CEOs with V < V * 2 change internal governance. There are two effects that determine the sign of this derivative. One is the same as before -diversion decreases with η. The other is that shareholders may offer low wages to low-power CEOs so that changing governance may occur. While we have not been able to determine the net effect analytically, numerical examples show for a wide range of parameter values that the first effect dominates.
The positive association between external and internal governance implies that country-wide improvements in governance generate a "race to the top" in internal governance as well. In the introduction to this paper we refer to the wave of firms announcing that they would voluntarily 
External governance reform and CEO pay
Improvements in external governance need not lead to lower wages. Indeed, CEOs may demand higher wages to be willing to give up their diversion income. We have the next result:
Proposition 3 Improvements in external governance η lead to increases in wages if γ < 1 or if γ > 1 and either V > V * 1 or V < V * 2 .
The intuition for this result is the following. When the conditions in the proposition hold, then the optimal wage is such that the individual rationality constraint binds. Since diversion decreases with η by Lemma 2, wages must increase with η to guarantee that the CEO receives the reservation utility V . In other words, the CEO has a strong appetite for private benefits and must be compensated in other ways if the cost of extracting private benefits increases.
It is interesting to consider the case where γ > 1 and V ∈ (V * 2 , V * 1 ) . In this case, the optimal wage is such that the incentive constraint binds. To determine the effect of η on the optimal wage, we have to determine its effect on not only the net benefit from diversion, but also the net benefit from change in governance A H − A L . We are not able to determine the latter effect analytically for general parameter values. However, in the appendix we prove that for sufficiently small p L − p H > 0, the optimal wage increases with η if and only if γ > 1 is large enough.
The intuition behind this result is the following. When p H and p L are sufficiently close, the net benefit from change in governance is small. For CEOs with sufficiently high risk aversion, this benefit is decreasing with η since these CEOs are hurt more by the monitoring risk. Thus, to incentivize these CEOs, shareholders must provide higher wages if η is higher. The opposite result holds for small values of γ > 1.
The prediction in proposition 3 is consistent with the much touted increase in CEO pay after Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. 12 It is an interesting empirical question to separate this pay increase between what is justified by the added certification requirements on CEOs and what is needed to compensate for the lower extraction of private benefits.
4.3
The association between internal governance and CEO pay Core et al. (1999) find empirical evidence that firms with weaker governance pay more to their CEOs (see Bebchuk and Fried (2005) and Thomas (2003) for surveys). In our model this is true for firms with CEOs with low risk aversion (γ < 1). To see this note from Proposition 1 that the wage rate is an increasing function of CEO power, ceteris paribus. The desired correlation arises, because Proposition 1 also implies that high CEO power leads to worse governance if γ < 1. This proves that:
Proposition 4 When γ < 1, changes in CEO power induce a negative association between the quality of internal governance and CEO pay. 2002) there is a direct causal link between firm governance and CEO pay. While our explanation also relies on CEOs exerting their power over the board, in our model the established correlation arises due to the endogeneity of firm governance and cross-sectional variation in CEO power: the association between weaker governance and higher wages is brought about by variation in CEO power. Hermalin (2005) , and his discussion of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , predicts that less board diligence, interpreted as weaker internal governance, is associated with higher wages. However, in his setup, but not in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , this association is driven by CEO ability and not CEO power.
Direct evidence in favor of a correlation that is driven by CEO power (as in Proposition 4 above) is given in Malmendier and Tate (2005) . These authors find that CEOs that receive prestigious awards by the business press, which we interpret as increasing their power, have their compensation increase at the same time that the incidence of earnings management increases. For CEOs with high risk aversion the relationship is reversed, because when γ > 1 high powered CEOs prefer high formal pay to diversion income. The added volatility associated with diversion income is too costly for these CEOs and they are not willing to pay the effort cost to change governance.
International pay gap
There is considerable evidence that CEOs in the United States receive higher average pay than CEOs outside of the United States, namely in Japan (e.g. Kaplan (1994) States than in Japan. Formally, the distribution of CEO power in the United States first order stochastically dominates that in Japan: for every possible level of CEO power V , the measure of CEOs with power equal to, or lower than V is higher in the United States than in Japan.
Because Proposition 1 shows that the optimal wage schedule is increasing in CEO power, the average CEO wage in the United States is therefore higher. Formally, Proposition 5 If the distribution of CEO power in the United States first order stochastically dominates that in Japan, the average wage in the United States is higher.
The assumption we make that there are relatively more high powered CEOs in the United
States than in Japan is in accordance with Bebchuk et al. (2002) who argue that the greater dispersion of outside shareholders in the United States leads to more managerial power in the United States with subsequent increased ability to extract higher wages.
Conclusion
We have developed a model built on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change within a corporation in the line of Hellwig (2000) . This sets the agency conflict on the choice of governance between CEOs and shareholders. The model highlights the role of managerial risk aversion in the pursuit of private benefits and the weakening of governance.
The model has predictions for how internal governance is affected by CEO power, country-wide governance and exogenous changes in CEO pay.
In our analysis we have treated CEO power as exogenous. This allows us to study how changes in the external environment, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, affect incentives in exercising CEO power, but does not allow us to comment on how CEO power itself is affected by SarbanesOxley. To do that we need an explicit model of how CEO power is determined, which requires, among other things, setting up a market for CEOs. We view the current paper as a building block toward this more general setup.
Appendices

A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: It follows from the first-order condition and simple algebra.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Using the first-order condition (7), we can solve for the diversion rate given in (9) . This solution is indeed optimal since the objective function in (4) is concave in d a .
Assumption 10 ensures that d a (w) ∈ (0, 1) . To show ∂d a (w) /∂η < 0 and ∂d a (w) /∂p a < 0, we use (7). An increase in η raises the marginal cost of diversion, which is represented by the expression on the left side of (7). But it does not change the marginal benefit from diversion, which is represented by the expression on the right side of (7). Thus, it lowers d a (w) . By a similar reasoning, an increase in p a lowers the marginal benefit from diversion and raises the marginal cost of diversion. Thus, it lowers d a (w) .
Proof of Lemma 3: Given (12), we derive
which is negative if and only if
Given the assumption (10), we have
Finally, since p L > p H , we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 4:
We form the Lagrangian:
where λ, μ ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers and satisfy the usual complementarity slackness conditions. The first-order condition is given by
Thus, it is impossible for λ = μ = 0. That is, one of the constraints (13) and (14) must bind.
(i) Consider γ < 1. If V < V * 1 , then (13) binds, and thus we can derive the wage w L given in (17) . This wage is such that (14) holds true. It follows that the profit is given by
Using Lemma 2 and simplifying yields (18) .
If V > V * 1 , then the individual rationality constraint (13) cannot bind. Thus, λ = 0. In order to satisfy (A.3), we must have μ > 0 and A L > A H . But this contradicts Lemma 3.
(ii) Consider γ > 1. If V ≥ V * 1 , then one can check that (13) binds and (14) does not bind. Thus, the wage and profit are given by (17)- (18) respectively. If V < V * 1 , then (14) binds and (13) does not bind. Thus, we can derive the wage w L given in (19) . Substituting this expression into (A.4) and using Lemma 2, we can derive (20) .
Proof of Lemma 5:
Thus, it is impossible for λ = μ = 0. That is, one of the constraints (22) and (23) (23) does not bind. Thus, we can derive the wage w H given in (25) . It follows that the profit is given by
Using Lemma 2 and simplifying yield (26).
If V < V * 1 , then the individual rationality constraint (22) cannot bind. Thus, λ = 0. In order to satisfy (A.6), we must have μ > 0 and A H > A L . By Lemma 3, the latter can be true only if γ < 1. Since (23) binds, we can derive the wage w H given in (27) . Substituting this expression into (A.7) and using Lemma 2, we can derive (28) .
(ii) Consider γ > 1. If V < V * 1 , then (22) bind and (23) does not bind. The wage and profit are given by (25)- (26) . If V > V * 1 , then (23) binds and (22) does not bind. As argued earlier, γ < 1 is necessary. Thus, V > V * 1 is impossible. Finally, If V = V * 1 , both constraints (22) and (23) bind. Thus, we can derive the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Consider first γ < 1.
If V > V * 1 , then it follows from Lemma 4 that low effort cannot be implemented. By Lemma 5, high effort is implemented and the wage and profit are given by (25)- (26) . If V < V * 1 , we compare profit in (18) and profit in (28) to determine which effort level is optimal to the shareholders. Since
Since by assumption V < V * 1 , to prove the preceding is true, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 6 Let assumption (8) hold. Then
Proof. Use (8), his expression is negative since ηp a < 1 − p a by assumption (8) or (10) . Thus, the desired result follows from p H < p L .
(ii) Consider γ > 1.
Suppose V > V * 1 . Then by Lemma 5 high effort cannot be implemented. By Lemma 4, low effort is implemented and the wage and profit are given by (17)- (18) . Suppose V * 2 < V < V * 1 . We compare profit from implementing low effort given in (20) with profit from implementing high effort given in (26) . Note that V * 2 is the value of V such that the two profit levels are equal. When V * 2 < V < V * 1 , we can check that we have
Thus, π L (V ) > π H (V ) and low effort is optimal.
Finally, suppose V < V * 2 . We can check the opposite inequality holds in (A.10). Thus, π L (V ) < π H (V ) and high effort is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The result follows because the threshold level V * 1 is increasing in η with low risk aversion, γ < 1. we get the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Recall that the term A a measures the net benefits of diversion.
Differentiation yields
Consider first the case of γ < 1. By Proposition 1, the optimal wage is given by (25) or (17) . Since (A.11) implies that A a decreases with η for γ < 1, the result follows.
Consider now the case of γ > 1. The optimal wage is given by (17) for V > V * 1 , and is given by (25) for V < V * 2 . Since (A.11) implies that A a decreases with η for γ > 1, the result follows. Now consider the case where γ > 1 and V * 2 < V < V * 1 . Since the optimal wage is given by (19) , it increases with η if and only if ∂A H /∂η < ∂A L /∂η. With p L − p H > 0 small this inequality is equivalent to ∂ 2 A a /∂η∂p a > 0. Using (A.11) this derivative is ∂ 2 A a ∂η∂p a = − (1 − γ) A a 1 + η dq a dp a − (1 − γ) q a 1 + η dA a dp a (A.12) The term in the numerator above is negative for γ close to 1 and positive for γ sufficiently large. Hence, for sufficiently large (small) γ > 1, pay increases (decreases) for these CEOs as well.
Proof of Proposition 4: See the main text.
Proof of Proposition 5: Proposition 1 implies that optimal wage is an increasing function of V . The result then follows from the definition of first-order stochastic dominance.
B The log-utility case (γ = 1)
Here, we treat the log-utility case, u (c, a) = log (c) − g (a). Lemma 2 applies when γ = 1 as well, yielding a value for d a . We then write expected utility as A a has the property that d log(A pa ) dp a = log The board's optimization problem can be solved to yield:
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the individual rationality constraint. This solution is optimal iff log A L ≥ −k + log A H otherwise, high effort is optimal. In the log-utility case, CEO power does not affect incentives because there is a separability between wages and benefits of diversion and wages drop from the incentive constraint (B.1).
Similarly, the constraints needed to implement the high effort choice are −k + log w + log A H ≥ V −k + log w + log A H ≥ log w + log A H , and the board's optimization problem yields:
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the individual rationality constraint. As before, since wages do not affect incentives, lower rent extraction dictates that the individual rationality constraint always binds. This solution is optimal iff log A 0 ≤ −k + log A 1 , otherwise low effort is optimal.
With log-utility either all CEOs choose a = H or they all choose a = L independent of managerial power and there is no role for randomizations.
